

The Quantum No-Cloning Game

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Ongoing Work with...



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
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— *Part 1* —

The Scenario


A Love Story...



Correctness: $Dec_k(Enc_k(m)) \stackrel{a.s.}{=} m.$

(Images generated by AI: Hotpot)

The No-Cloning Game



(Images generated by AI: Hotpot)

- **Rule:** $\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{B}, \mathcal{C}$ win iff. $m = m_B = m_C$.
- If $Enc_k(m)$ is classical, then $\mathbb{P}(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{B}, \mathcal{C} \text{ win}) = 1$. So we are interested in $Enc_k(m) \in \mathcal{D}(\mathbb{C}^d)$ quantum state.
- If $m \in \{0, 1\}^n$ and \mathcal{P} sends a uniformly random message $m_B = m_C$ to \mathcal{B}, \mathcal{C} , then $\mathbb{P}(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{B}, \mathcal{C} \text{ win}) = 1/2^n = 0.5^n$.
- **Problem:** Find an encryption scheme for Alice that is “secure”.

Uncloneable Security¹


Definition. The encryption scheme Enc_k is said to be $t(\lambda)$ -**uncloneable secure**, with $0 \leq t(\lambda) \leq n$, if the optimal winning probability is “almost” the random one:

$$\mathbb{P}^*(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{B}, \mathcal{C} \text{ win}) \leq 2^{t(\lambda)} \cdot 0.5^n + \text{negl.}(\lambda),$$

where $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ is the security parameter, and n is the size of the message m .

Remarks.

- $t = 0$ is ideal.
- $t = n$ is trivial.



¹Broadbent and Lord. *Uncloneable Quantum Encryption via Oracles*. 2020.

— *Part 2* —

Known Results

Open Question

- Gottesman² introduced a scheme that detects if an adversary could have had information about the plaintext when it was encrypted.
- **Open Question.** Is it possible to find an encryption scheme that would prevent the splitting of a ciphertext?


²Gottesman. “Uncloneable Encryption”. In: *Quantum Info. Comput.* (2003).

Attempt Without Assumption

Encryption scheme: \mathcal{A} encrypts her message $m \in \{0, 1\}^n$ in a Wiesner state $|m^k\rangle := H^{k_1}|m_1\rangle \otimes \cdots \otimes H^{k_n}|m_n\rangle$, with a key $k \in \{0, 1\}^n$:

$$\text{Enc}_k(m) := |m^k\rangle\langle m^k|.$$

Decryption scheme: $\text{Dec}_k(\rho) :=$ measurement of $H^k \rho H^k$ in the computational basis.



Theorem ([Tomamichel – Fehr – Kaniewski – Wehner]³)


Using this Enc_k , no matter what $\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{B}, \mathcal{C}$ do, their winning probability is bounded by:

$$\mathbb{P}^*(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{B}, \mathcal{C} \text{ win}) = \left(\cos^2(\pi/8) \right)^n \approx 0.85^n.$$

³Tomamichel et al. “A monogamy-of-entanglement game with applications to device-independent quantum cryptography”. In: *New Journal of Physics* (2013).

Result in the Quantum Random Oracle Model

- **Definition.** “A **quantum-secure pseudorandom function (qPRF)** is a keyed function $f_\lambda : \{0, 1\}^\lambda \times \{0, 1\}^{\ell_{in}(\lambda)} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{\ell_{out}(\lambda)}$, with $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, which appears random to an efficient quantum adversary who only sees its input/output behaviour and is ignorant of the particular key being used.”




Theorem ([Broadbent – Lord]⁴)

If the qPRF is modeled by a q. oracle, this encryption is $\log_2(9)$ -uncloneable secure:

$$\mathbb{P}(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{B}, \mathcal{C} \text{ win}) \leq 9 \times 0.5^n .$$

⁴Broadbent and Lord. *Uncloneable Quantum Encryption via Oracles*. 2020.

Result with Interactions and Eavesdropping



(Images generated by AI: Hotpot)

- **Theorem ([Broadbent – Culf]):** For quantum encryption schemes of classical messages with interactive decryption, there is an equivalence between uncloneable and uncloneable-indistinguishable security.

(Broadbent and Culf. “Uncloneable Cryptographic Primitives with Interaction”. In: (2023). arXiv: 2303.00048)

Results Under Other Assumptions

- Assumption of post-quantum one-way functions or post-quantum public key encryption.⁵
- Variant where \mathcal{A} sends different keys to \mathcal{B} and \mathcal{C} .⁶
- Assumption of post-quantum hardness of the learning with errors (LWE) problem.⁷
- Assumption of post-quantum indistinguishability obfuscation, one-way functions, and compute-and-compare obfuscation.⁸

⁵Ananth and Kaleoglu. “Unclonable Encryption, Revisited”. In: 2021.

⁶Kundu and Tan. *Device-independent uncloneable encryption*. 2023. arXiv: 2210.01058.

⁷Gheorghiu, Metger, and Poremba. *Quantum cryptography with classical communication: parallel remote state preparation for copy-protection, verification, and more*. 2022. arXiv: 2201.13445.










⁸Chevalier, Hermouet, and Vu. *Unclonable Cryptography in the Plain Model*. 2023.

— *Part 3* —

Our Conjecture

(Hidden in the online version.)

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